Andyroo wrote: ↑
Mon Jun 24, 2019 11:51 pm
There was an interesting note on how effective these attacks could be last year:
In fact, I doubt we will ever see a lot of in-the-wild malware using the Meltdown or Spectre exploits. Memory-read attacks simply aren't that attractive to most attackers: they don't allow an attacker to run arbitrary code on a targeted system, nor do they give the attacker access to stored data they are interested in. It is telling that Heartbleed, an unrelated attack that also allowed access to large chunks of memory, was not exploited widely in the wild, if it even was at all.
Taken from https://www.virusbulletin.com/blog/2018 ... r-spectre/
I know there are ‘working samples’ at https://meltdownattack.com/
but I’m more concerned how stable Buster will be
I think these side-channel information leaks mostly affect cloud providers by demonstrating that partitioning an Intel Xeon server into multiple virtual machines doesn't provide anywhere near the isolation and security that the marketing types wanted.
At this point various mitigations that negatively affect performance have been added upstream to Linux and applications that require additional security. Therefore, the standard mitigations are surely in place for Raspbian. In the future, I suspect one may see specialized hardware designed for security-sensitive code paths. For example, if it weren't for Oracle cancelling future development, the SPARC M8 security-in-silicon encrypted memory seems like a promising way to avoid many side channel attacks.